Inevitable post about House of Cards

So the missus and I just finished watching the US version of House of Cards with Kevin Spacey in the Ian Richard role and "Francis Urquhart" translated into the more southern US friendly "Frank Underwood".

I've been putting together my thoughts on the distribution model and have a half written post on it that I'll finish soon but as we watched it, while she was able to enjoy it purely on the merits, I spent the entire time trying to resist the urge to say "of course in the British version it happens like this..."

So I've decided to take those annoying points and list a couple here. Obviously huge spoilers ahead for anyone who hasn't seen both versions:


Main point: the basic plot seems a lot better suited to Britain in 1990 than the US in 2013


There are two main reasons for this.

Government in the UK is focused almost exclusively on the House of Commons. Who the Prime Minister is depends on who the majority party in the Commons wants to have as its leader so if you can manipulate that (as Urquhart does) then you can quite easily destabilise a PM, particularly if you're the Chief Whip and it's your job to manipulate and cajole the backbenchers.

In the US, government is spread across legally separate branches and the president is decided by direct election regardless of whether members of congress want him or not. He's also the president for the whole of a fixed term and unless he dies (Kennedy), chooses to resign (Nixon) or is impeached and removed from office (Clinton almost) then he's not going anywhere regardless of what congress thinks. They can block his appointments, block bills he wants to pass and do whatever they want to make his re-election less likely but they're can't get rid of him unless he's committed an impeachable offence.

The situations are different as well, the British PM in question is basically John Major (although I swear he looks like an older version of David Cameron), lacking the confidence of his backbenchers after very narrowly winning an election and replacing Margaret Thatcher in what they considered an act of regicide. His position was always going to be unstable. The US president (Walker I think) is in the first year of his first term and thus quite a bit more secure.

The other reason is that the whole backroom, wheeler dealer, insider trader political game works fine for Underwood's earlier plans (digging up dirt to derail a secretary of state nomination etc), it becomes a bit more difficult when he paves the way for himself to become vice president.
Long story short, he puts up a recovering alcoholic as candidate for governor in a key state, has him fall (brutally, publicly) off the wagon with a few weeks to go and the only person who can take his place is the vice president, leading to a vacancy which Underwood's legislative success and connections make him the natural person to fill.
The problem is that the big story in the US over the last few years has been the rejection of establishment candidates in favour of outsiders. The idea of a senior congressman imposing a candidate for governor on a large state, particularly one with as many flaws as Pete Russo, might have been believable a few decades ago but in 2013 it's pretty unrealistic.


Other small points:

• There were a few elements that felt like the producers were trying to be faithful to the UK version but didn't really need to be. The whole "senior politician seduces and manipulates young female journalist" angle seemed a bit superfluous in the US version. Very little of Underwood's plan needs Zoe Barnes and I'm assuming it was a deliberate choice to make her completely unlikable. Lots of clichés about old media types not understanding the internet that felt very 2006 and it seems like the only reason for Zoe to exist is to facilitate Underwood's eventual downfall. The less said about them getting into bed together the better
• The US president is really, really bland and boring and I find this generally happens in dramas with a world leader. These people are on TV every day and generally among the most recognisable faces on earth so it feels weird when later on it's difficult to remember what they look or sound like. The obvious solution is to write them with more personality (and better writing generally) but the other one is surely to get a more expensive and famous actor. The West Wing was originally going to have Alan Alda or Sidney Poitier before making the President a regular character and giving it to Martin Sheen
• Holy product placement Batman! I like the fact that Underwood likes to relax by wasting people on the PS3, not least because it's a nice acknowledgement that actually millions of people do this to relax, not just the cast of the Big Bang Theory. But there was a bit in episode 4 (I think) where he talks about the virtues of the PS Vita which tipped it right over the edge. There's also the fact that nobody in Washington seems to own a non-Apple computer

Anyway, the US series was good enough to keep us watching to the end and we'll more than likely come back to watch the next series when it appears so I suppose it's done the job.

The Europe speech (finally!)

I've been meaning to write something on David Cameron's "game changing" (or maybe not?) speech on Europe in which he promised a renegotiation of Britain's membership followed by a referendum to either ratify the new arrangement or leave the EU entirely.


Bottom line is that the biggest impact will be if Labour decides to match the renegotiate/referendum commitment or whether they stick to their current position of not offering one.

Because while David Cameron says he wants Britain to remain in the EU under more favourable terms, that scenario relies on a huge number of "ifs". By "huge number", I really mean 3:

1. the Conservatives win a majority (currently being offered at 13/8 on Ladbrokes)

2. the other EU leaders are willing to grant any sort of concession to the UK

and of course:

3. the public back whatever settlement is presented to them

I'd say the chances of a Conservative majority, especially after the boundary change was voted down, are fairly slim (though not impossible) and my prediction for 2015 is currently a toss up between narrow Labour majority or a hung Parliament with the Conservatives as the largest party. The referendum promise therefore requires the consent of whoever gives David Cameron the necessary majority in the Commons to remain as PM.

The second also seems very unlikely and this is something that I've talked about before. The "renegotiate then referendum" approach was tried before by Harold Wilson in 1975. He achieved a fairly meaningless renegotiation but it was enough to say that membership was now acceptable and campaign for a "yes" vote.

I expect David Cameron to achieve even less because at least in 1975 there was some good will towards the UK for the tortured process it had to endure when joining (namely the double deGaulle veto and high financial costs imposed that other members thought unfair). The rest of Europe currently sees the UK as carping from the sidelines and using a moment of existential peril for the Eurozone countries as an opportunity to take advantage for itself. A bit like war profiteering. It probably doesn't help that some Eurosceptics talk about the leverage for renegotiation in precisely these terms.

If David Cameron goes in and unilaterally demands better terms for Britain while remaining a full member of the single market, he will be met with frosty glares and awkward silence. His only hope is if Angela Merkel believes Britain is important enough as a liberal (and fiscally conservative) counterweight to protectionist (and fiscally profligate) countries like France that it is worth granting some minor concessions to keep the UK at the table.

This may be why David Cameron's speech tried to make the renegotiation issue less about Britain seeking unique terms of membership than about reforming the whole EU to make it work better for all members (i.e. work better for Britain, the others being a side benefit).

My prediction is that Angela Merkel and the other EU leaders will offer David Cameron some minor, fairly meaningless concession on an area unrelated to the single market but that even if this is not offered, Cameron will present the result of "renegotiation" as success and campaign in a referendum for it to be accepted.
He will be joined by Labour, the Lib Dems and most of the business community and the public will vote to remain an EU member under the "new" terms.

However, as mentioned, all this depends on either a Conservative majority in 2015 or whichever party props up a Conservative led coalition acceding to his European policy. The odds of which seem slim at the moment.

Therefore the interesting thing is whether Labour will offer a referendum or not. Tony Blair agreed to a referendum on the European Constitution to stop Michael Howard using it against him and the Conservatives, and Eurosceptic press, are already hitting Ed Miliband for his refusal to offer one on Britain's membership.

But despite the coverage it gets, Europe is still nowhere near the most important issue for the public and elections are decided on the state of the economy and the competence of the potential government. Labour are still blamed for the state the economy was in two years ago but with a potential triple-dip recession, the Conservatives advantage on this issue may disappear and Labour may end up in government despite taking a beating on Europe throughout the campaign.

However, if Labour does promise a referendum on the topic then, as I've also blogged about before, EU exit becomes more likely as the defeated Conservatives will likely lurch to the right and unite in favour of withdrawal. The in/out referendum then becomes (unpopular) Labour government against the media and a united right making withdrawal much more likely.

Eurosceptics therefore may find themselves facing a strange situation in which a Labour victory is more likely to lead to Britain leaving the EU than a Conservative one.